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We investigate the error tolerance of quantum cryptographic protocols using d-level systems. In
particular, we focus on prepare-and-measure schemes that use two mutually unbiased bases and a
key-distillation procedure with two-way classical communication. For arbitrary quantum channels,
we obtain a sufficient condition for secret-key distillation which, in the case of isotropic quantum
channels, yields an analytic expression for the maximally tolerable error rate of the cryptographic
protocols under consideration. The difference between the tolerable error rate and its theoretical
upper bound tends slowly to zero for sufficiently large dimensions of the information carriers.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Hk
I. INTRODUCTION
Provable entanglement has been shown to be a nec-
essary precondition for secure quantum key-distribution
(QKD) in the context of any protocol [1, 2]. Recently [3],
we investigated the maximal average disturbance (error
rate) up to which the two legitimate users (Alice and
Bob) of a QKD protocol can prove the presence of quan-
tum correlations in their sifted classical data. In par-
ticular, we focused on qudit-based QKD protocols using
two Fourier-dual bases (to be referred to hereafter as 2d-
state protocols). Under the assumption of arbitrary joint
(coherent) attacks we showed that the threshold distur-
bance for provable entanglement scales with the qudit-
dimension d as
Dth(d) =
d− 1
2d
. (1)
This theoretical upper bound on tolerable error rates
for 2d-state protocols is valid for arbitrary dimensions,
provided that Alice and Bob focus on their sifted key and
do not apply any collective measurements on their halves.
Its implications are obvious for estimated disturbances
above Dth namely, Alice and Bob are not able to infer
whether the correlations in their data have originated
from an entangled state or not, and the protocol must be
aborted. However, for detected disturbances below Dth,
the picture is incomplete. In particular, based on the
above result we only know that the two honest parties can
be confident that they share provable entanglement with
high probability. Thus, the necessary precondition for
secret-key distillation is satisfied for disturbances up to
Dth. Nevertheless, the details of a prepare-and-measure
(P&M) scheme which will be capable of attaining this
theoretical bound are unknown. In fact, it is not at all
clear whether such a P&M scheme exists.
So far, the highest tolerable error rates in the frame-
work of P&M QKD schemes have been reported for pro-
tocols using a two-way Gottesman-Lo-type procedure for
key distillation [4]. This procedure was introduced and
improved in the context of the standard qubit-based
(d = 2) QKD protocols [4, 5]. It is based on local
quantum operations and two-way classical communica-
tion (LOCC2) and is able to provide the two legitimate
users with an unconditionally secure key up to high er-
ror rates. In particular for the standard 4-state qubit-
based protocol (BB84) the tolerable error rate is 20%
[5, 6] which is well below the corresponding theoretical
upper bound given by Eq. (1), that is 25%. The natural
question arises therefore whether this gap still persists
for higher dimensions (d > 2) and, in particular, how it
scales with the dimension d of information carriers.
Recently, extending the Gottesman-Lo two-way key
distillation (GL2KD) procedure to higher dimensions,
Chau addressed this open question in the context of fully-
symmetric qudit-based QKD schemes using all (d + 1)
possible mutually unbiased bases [7]. More precisely he
showed that if d is a prime power, the tolerable error-rate
scales with dimension as 1− (3 +√5)/2d, for d→∞.
In this paper, our purpose is to analyze the error toler-
ance of 2d-state QKD protocols using a GL2KD process.
In contrast to the protocols considered in [7], the proto-
cols considered here are not necessarily fully symmetric.
In general, we have only one symmetry constraint i.e., the
symmetry between the two Fourier-dual bases used in the
protocol. Hence, the problem in its most general form is
analytically solvable to some extent only. Specifically,
we are able to derive a sufficient condition for secret-
key distillation in which the number of open parameters
scales quadratically with d. However, the derivation of
an analytic expression for the tolerable error rate is pos-
sible under additional symmetry assumptions related to
isotropic quantum channels. In this case, we find that
the asymptotic (d → ∞) tolerable error-rate scales with
dimension as 1/2− 1/4√d, and slowly approaches there-
fore its theoretical upper bound determined by Eq.(1),
that is 1/2.
The organization of the paper follows the three phases
of a typical P&M QKD scheme. In Sec. II, for the sake of
completeness we briefly summarize basic facts about the
first two phases of a 2d-state QKD protocol, i.e., quantum
state distribution and verification test. Subsequently, in
Sec. III we focus on the key-distillation phase which is
the main subject of this work. In particular we con-
2sider a GL2KD procedure. Our analysis is based on the
entanglement-based version of the 2d-state QKD proto-
col, whose reduction to a P&M scheme is summarized
at the end of the section. An analytic expression for
the tolerable error-rate is derived in Sec. IV under the
assumption of isotropic quantum channels. Finally, we
conclude with a short summary and outlook in Sec. V.
II. THE FIRST TWO STAGES OF TWO-BASIS
QKD PROTOCOLS
For the sake of simplicity, and without loss of gen-
erality, we will focus on prime dimensions only. Thus,
throughout this work all the arithmetics are performed
in the finite (Galois) field Fd = {0, 1, . . . , d − 1} [8]. It
has to be noted, however, that similar arguments hold if
d is a prime power but the formalism is more involved
(e.g., see [3]).
In general, theoretical investigations of d-level quan-
tum systems (qudits) are performed conveniently with
the help of the generalized Pauli operators
Amn :=
∑
l∈Fd
Φ(l · n) |l −m〉〈l| form,n ∈ Fd, (2)
where Φ(x) ≡ exp( i2pixd ). These d2 operators form a
faithful projective unitary representation of (Z\dZ) ×
(Z\dZ) and an error basis on the Hilbert space of a qudit
Cd [9].
In a typical 2d-state P&M scheme, Alice and Bob use
for their purposes two mutually unbiased bases. Follow-
ing [3, 10, 11], throughout this work we choose the eigen-
basis { |α〉 : α ∈ Fd} of A01 as the standard (computa-
tional) basis B1, while the second basis B2 is the Fourier
dual of the computational basis with the discrete Fourier
transformation given by
F :=
1√
d
∑
i,j∈Fd
Φ(i · j) |i〉〈j| .
Hence, the indices m and n in Eq. (2), refer to dit-flip
and phase errors in the standard basis B1, respectively.
Moreover, F†AmnF = Φ(−m·n)A∗nm which indicates that
dit-flip errors in the computational basis become phase
errors in the complementary basis and vice-versa.
In general, the first stage of a QKD protocol is the
quantum state distribution stage which involves quan-
tum state (signal) preparation and transmission via an
insecure quantum channel. The purpose of this phase is
to establish correlations between Alice and Bob, which
may also involve correlations with a third untrusted
party (eavesdropper). As far as a typical 2d-state P&M
scheme is concerned, this first stage proceeds as follows
[3, 7, 10, 11]. Alice sends to Bob a sequence of qudits
each of which is randomly prepared in one of the 2d non-
orthogonal basis-states (d states for each basis). Bob
measures each received particle randomly in B1 or B2.
Alice and Bob publicly discuss the bases chosen, discard-
ing all the dits where they have selected different bases
(sifting).
Generalizing the ideas presented in [12], the aforemen-
tioned state-distribution process can be viewed as follows
[3, 7, 10, 11]. Alice prepares each of N ≫ 1 entangled-
qudit pairs in the maximally entangled state |Ψ00〉.
Thereby, the generalized maximally entangled states in
the Hilbert space of two distinguishable qudits CdA ⊗CdB
are defined as |Ψmn〉 :=
∑
j∈Fd
|jA〉 ⊗ A(B)mn |jB〉/
√
d,
where from now on the subscripts A and B refer to Al-
ice and Bob, respectively [7, 10, 11, 13, 14]. Alice keeps
half of each pair and submits the other half to Bob after
having applied at random and independently, a unitary
transformation chosen from the set {1 ,F}. As soon as
Bob receives the particles, he acknowledges the fact and
applies at random 1 or F−1 on each qudit independently.
Alice reveals the sequence of operations she performed
and all the pairs which involve different operations on
the transmitted qudit are discarded. This is the asso-
ciated entanglement-based (EB) version of the 2d-state
QKD protocol and offers many advantages, in particular
with respect to security issues and error tolerance.
The second stage of the QKD protocol is the verifica-
tion test (also called signal-quality test) which we dis-
cussed in detail elsewhere [3]. In this stage, the two
legitimate users sacrifice part of their (quantum) sig-
nal in order to quantify the eavesdropping rate during
the transmission stage. More precisely, after a random
permutation of their sifted (qu)dit pairs, Alice and Bob
randomly select a sufficiently large number of them and
determine their average error probability (disturbance).
If as a result of a noisy quantum channel (from now on
all the noise in the channel is attributed to eavesdrop-
ping) the estimated disturbance is too high, the protocol
is aborted. Otherwise, Alice and Bob proceed to the key-
distillation phase which will be discussed in detail in the
following section.
At any rate, it is always worth keeping in mind that
the success of the verification test (and thus security)
relies on two key points. First, an eavesdropper does
not now in advance which qudit-pairs will be chosen for
quality checks and which qudit-pairs will contribute to
the final key. Second, any joint eavesdropping attack can
be reduced to a classical (probabilistic) cheating strategy
for which classical sampling theory can be safely applied
[4, 7, 15, 16].
In particular, the action of the quantum channel can
be regarded as a Pauli one [4, 7]. At the end of the dis-
tribution stage of the 2d-state protocol, each transmitted
qudit may have undergone any of the d2 possible types
of errors Amn. Let pmn denote the rate (probability) of
errors of the form Amn in the particles shared between
Alice and Bob, with∑
m,n∈Fd
pmn = 1. (3)
In general, any symmetries underlying the QKD proto-
3col under consideration may imply additional constraints
on pmn. For the protocols under consideration, both
Fourier-dual bases are used at random and independently
on each qudit-pair during the transmission. Moreover,
the choices of the bases are not known to an eavesdrop-
per, and they are publicly announced only after all the
particles are in Bob’s possession. Thus, as a result of the
symmetry between the two bases, the quantum channel
connecting Alice and Bob yields different sets of identical
error-probabilities [3]. In particular, we have that
pmn = pn,d−m = pd−m,d−n = pd−n,m, ∀m,n ∈ Fd. (4)
Note that in highly symmetric protocols, the correspond-
ing symmetry between all (d+1) mutually unbiased bases
leads to a depolarizing quantum channel with pmn = p01
for all (m,n) 6= (0, 0) [7].
In view of the symmetries (4), the estimated distur-
bance during the verification test is given by [3]
D =
∑
m∈F∗
d
pm0 +
∑
m∈F∗
d
∑
n∈F∗
d
pmn, (5)
where F∗d := Fd\{0}. This estimated error rate should
not be confused with the so-called quantum-channel
(overall) error rate Q = 1−p00, which is not estimable in
a typical verification test of a P&M 2d-state QKD pro-
tocol.
At this point, we have all the necessary formalism
and we turn to investigate the error tolerance of 2d-state
P&M protocols.
III. ANALYSIS OF THE TWO-WAY KEY
DISTILLATION
Throughout this work we focus on the GL2KD proce-
dure in the context of which the highest tolerable error
rates have been reported for various P&M QKD schemes
[4, 5, 7]. Our purpose is to investigate the conditions
under which an insecure quantum channel allows the dis-
tillation of a secret key in the context of 2d-state QKD
protocols and the GL2KD procedure. Such an analysis
can be performed conveniently in the EB version of the
protocols we described in the previous section and adopt
from now on. We will close this section with the reduc-
tion of the EB scheme to a P&M one.
A. Dit-flip error rejection (DER)
As any other key-distillation process, the GL2KD has
two stages [4, 5, 7]. The first stage is a typical two-way
entanglement purification with LOCC2 [13, 14, 17, 18].
More precisely, in order to reduce the dit-flip-error rate in
their signal Alice and Bob apply a number of D-steps. In
each D-step, they form tetrads of particles by randomly
pairing up their qudit-pairs. Then, within each tetrad
of particles they apply a bilateral exclusive OR (BXOR)
operation. Specifically, Alice and Bob individually apply
to their halves the unitary operation
XORc→t : |x〉c ⊗ |y〉t 7→ |x〉c ⊗ |x− y〉t, (6)
where c and t denote the control and target qudit, respec-
tively. Subsequently, they measure their target qudits
in the computational basis and compare their outcomes.
The control qudit-pair is kept if and only if their out-
comes agree, while the target pair is always discarded.
In general, this procedure is repeated many times
(many rounds of D-step) until the dit-flip-error rate in
the surviving qudit-pairs is sufficiently low to guaran-
tee an arbitrarily small total error rate at the end of
the key-distillation protocol. We are going to make this
statement more precise later on. For the time being, we
turn to analyze the effect of the D-steps on the signal
shared between Alice and Bob.
Following [4, 5, 7], our analysis will be based on classi-
cal probability arguments since any eavesdropping attack
can be reduced to a classical probabilistic one. In partic-
ular, let S = {pmn| m,n ∈ Fd} be the set of error rates
(error-probability distribution) at the beginning of DER
(i.e., at the end of the first stage of the QKD protocol).
It has been shown [14] that the effect of k rounds of D-
step (with k ∈ N) on S can be identified by a mapping
Dk : S 7→ Sk, where Sk = {p(k)mn| m,n ∈ Fd} and
p(k)mn =
∑
l∈Fd
Φ(−n · l)
[∑
j∈Fd
Φ(l · j) pmj
]2k
d
∑
i∈Fd
(∑
j∈Fd
pij
)2k . (7)
One can readily check that by setting d = 2, this map-
ping reduces to the well-known mapping for qubit-based
protocols [4, 5].
Clearly, p
(k)∗
mn = p
(k)
mn since the summations in Eq. (7)
run over all the finite field Fd. Furthermore, for the same
reason, Eq. (7) can be rewritten as
p(k)mn =
[C(m)]
2k
+
∑
l∈F∗
d
Φ(−l · n) [A(m, l)]2k
d
[
1 +
∑
l∈F∗
d
[C(l)]
2k
] , (8)
where
A(m, l) =
∑
j∈Fd
Φ(l · j)pmj∑
j∈Fd
p0j
, (9a)
C(m) =
∑
j∈Fd
pmj∑
j∈Fd
p0j
, (9b)
for m, l ∈ Fd.
From now on we restrict ourselves to estimated distur-
bances D < Dth, since for D ≥ Dth Alice and Bob do
not share provable entanglement [3, 4, 5]. Furthermore,
for D < Dth we also have∑
n∈Fd
p0n >
∑
n∈Fd
pmn ∀m ∈ F∗d, (10)
4which implies that 0 ≤ C(m) < 1, ∀ m ∈ Fd. Besides, a
necessary condition for 0 ≤ p(k)mn ≤ 1 after many rounds
of D-step is |A(m, l)| < 1, for all m, l ∈ Fd. Thus, as
k → ∞, we have |A|2k → 0 and |C|2k → 0 which imply
that p
(k)
0n → 1/d and p(k)mn → 0, for m,n ∈ Fd and m 6= 0.
In other words, the main effect of DER on the surviving
particles shared between Alice and Bob is to reduce errors
of the form Amn with m 6= 0, while increasing the rate
of pure phase errors of the form A0n with n 6= 0.
In particular, let
R
(k)
D =
∑
m∈F∗
d
∑
n∈Fd
p(k)mn (11a)
and
R
(k)
P =
∑
m∈Fd
∑
n∈F∗
d
p(k)mn ≡
∑
n∈F∗
d
q(k)n (11b)
be the total dit-flip- and phase-error rates after k rounds
of D-step, respectively. As k → ∞, R(k)D → 0 whereas
R
(k)
P → (d − 1)/d. We must therefore have a closer
look at the corresponding individual phase-error rates
q
(k)
n which, using Eq. (8), are given by
q(k)n =
∑
m∈Fd
p(k)mn =
1
d
+
ξ
(k)
n
d
[
1 + χ(k)
] (12)
for all n ∈ Fd, where
ξ(k)n =
∑
m∈Fd
∑
l∈F∗
d
Φ(−l · n) [A(m, l)]2k , (13a)
χ(k) =
∑
m∈F∗
d
[C(m)]
2k
. (13b)
Clearly, the parameters ξ
(k)
n and χ(k) also take arbitrarily
small values as k →∞, since |A|2k → 0 and |C|2k → 0.
Observation 1. The phase-error rates after k rounds of
D-step satisfy the inequality
q
(k)
0 > q
(k)
n ∀n ∈ F∗d, (14)
where q
(k)
0 is the no-phase-error probability.
Proof. First of all, recall that throughout this work we
assume prime dimensions only. Starting from Eq. (12),
we have to show that ξ
(k)
0 > ξ
(k)
n , for all n 6= 0. Using
the symmetry condition (4), Eq. (13a) reads
ξ(k)n =
2
∑⌊d/2⌋
m=0
∑⌊d/2⌋
l=1 cos(l · n)T (m, l)[∑
j∈Fd
p0j
]2k ∀n ∈ Fd,
(15)
where all T (m, l) are real and positive. In particular, we
have that
T (0, l) =

p00 + 2 ⌊d/2⌋∑
j=1
cos(l · j)p0j


2k
,
T (m, l) = 2ℜ



∑
j∈Fd
Φ(l · j)pmj


2k

 , form 6= 0.
where ℜ(x) denotes the real part of x. In view of Eq.
(15), Eq. (14) now follows immediately from the in-
equality ξ
(k)
0 > ξ
(k)
n as a consequence of the fact that
cos(x) < 1, ∀x ∈ F∗d. A similar but more involved calcu-
lation can be performed if d is a prime power. 
B. Phase error correction (PEC)
Assume now that Alice and Bob have applied a DER
process involving many (k ≫ 1) rounds of D-step. As we
have just discussed, at this point the dit-flip-error rate
in their surviving pairs will be negligible (i.e., p
(k)
mn ≃ 0
for m 6= 0), whereas the phase-error rate has possibly
increased. It is therefore reasonable that the second stage
of the GL2KD (usually called privacy amplification) deals
with phase error correction (PEC) [4, 5, 7].
In general, at the beginning of the PEC we have a d-ary
asymmetric channel with respect to phase errors. In par-
ticular, we have (d− 1) possible phase errors with corre-
sponding probabilities (rates) q
(k)
n given by Eq. (12). To
correct the phase errors, Alice and Bob apply an [r, 1, r]d
repetition code with a relative majority-vote decoding
[8]. The key point is that, according to inequality (14),
the necessary condition [8] for such an error correction to
work is satisfied at the end of the DER process.
For the sake of completeness, let us briefly summarize
the main steps of the PEC procedure [4, 5, 7]. Alice and
Bob randomly divide their qudit-pairs into sets (blocks),
each containing r qudit-pairs. Within each block, they
perform a discrete Fourier transform FA ⊗ FB on each
pair. Subsequently, they perform a sequence of (r − 1)
BXOR operations with the same control pair (say the
first one) and targets each one of the remaining pairs.
For each target pair, they measure their corresponding
halves and estimate the parity of their outcomes. Finally,
they apply F−1A ⊗ F−1B on the control pair and Bob per-
forms A0s on his control-qudit, where s ∈ Fd is the par-
ity corresponding to the relative majority of their (r− 1)
outcomes. If the relative majority of the outcomes is am-
biguous, Bob applies A00. In this way, each block may
result in one phase-error-free qudit-pair at most.
Our task now is to investigate the effect of such a PEC
process on the signal shared between Alice and Bob. Let
us denote by pPmn the various error rates in the remaining
qudit-pairs at the end of the process. We are mainly
interested in the corresponding total dit-flip- and phase-
error rates.
51. Phase-error rate
Let us start with the estimation of an upper bound on
the total phase-error rate RP ≡
∑
m
∑
n6=0 p
P
mn of the
signal at the end of PEC. We are basically interested in
the limit of large block-lengths r, that is in the limit of a
large number of distributed qudit-pairs.
Before we proceed further, it is worth noting that the
problem under consideration belongs to a well known
class of stochastic processes, the so-called occupancy
problems or Balls-and-Bins experiments. In this pic-
ture, our problem can be viewed as a probabilistic ex-
periment where r balls (qudit-pairs) are randomly dis-
tributed among d different (error-)bins. This class of
problems is fundamental to the analysis of randomized
algorithms and has been extensively studied in the lit-
erature (e.g., see [19, 20, 21]). A particularly useful re-
sult in this context are the so-called Chernoff-Hoeffding
bounds [22] which are basically large-deviation estimates.
In general, these bounds are applicable to sums of neg-
atively associated, identically distributed random vari-
ables. Their precise derivation can be found in various
papers and standard textbooks (e.g., see [20, 21, 22, 23]).
Observation 2. The phase-error rate in the surviving
pairs at the end of PEC satisfies the condition
RP ≤
∑
n∈F∗
d
[
1−
(√
q
(k)
0 −
√
q
(k)
n
)2]r
. (16)
Proof. Clearly, we have that RP is upper bounded by
the probability of failure for the repetition code Pfail. It
suffices therefore, to estimate an upper bound on Pfail.
As we mentioned before, PEC is applied on a particular
asymmetric channel with phase-error rates q0 > qj for
all j 6= 0 (to simplify notation throughout this proof
we write qj instead of q
(k)
j ). Let us denote by ηj the
total number of qudit-pairs within a block of length r
suffering from phase errors of the form Amj, withm ∈ Fd.
Clearly, majority voting fails only if ηj > η0 for some
j 6= 0, where η0 denotes the number of error-free pairs in
the block. For asymmetric channels satisfying Eq. (14),
this may occur for sufficiently large deviations of ηj from
their mean values. In particular, we expect for the failure
probability of the majority-vote decoding,
Pfail ≤ P

 ∨
j∈F∗
d
(ηj ≥ η0)

 ≤ ∑
j∈F∗
d
P (ηj ≥ η0) .
(17)
where
∨
is the logical OR operator. The next step now
is to upper bound each of the probabilities P (ηj ≥ η0)
appearing in the last summation.
Let us focus on a particular term, say P (ηi ≥ η0). We
will work with the radom variables ηi, η0 and ηrest, where
ηi + η0 + ηrest = r and ηrest =
∑
j 6∈{0,i} ηj . Accord-
ingly, the corresponding probability distribution of inter-
est is (q0, qi, qrest) with qi + q0 + qrest = 1. Obviously,
(η0, ηi, ηrest) have a trinomial distribution which is given
by
P (η0, ηi, ηrest) =
r∑
ηrest=0
(
r
ηrest
)
qηrestrest
[
ri∑
ηi=0
(
ri
ηi
)
qη00 q
ηi
i
]
,
where ri = η0 + ηi = r − ηrest. Introducing the new
normalized probabilities q˜l = ql/(q0 + qi) with l ∈ {0, i},
the trinomial distribution can be rewritten as
P (η0, ηi, ηrest) =
r∑
ηrest=0
(
r
ηrest
)
qηrestrest (q0 + qi)
r−ηrest
×
[
ri∑
ηi=0
(
ri
ηi
)
q˜η00 q˜
ηi
i
]
.
Note now that the expression in the brackets is the well
known binomial distribution involving the two events of
interest, i.e., the event of phase-error i, and the event of
no-phase-error. In particular, for a given ηrest the prob-
ability that ηi ≥ η0 is given by
P (ηi ≥ η0 | ηrest) =
ri∑
ηi=⌈ri/2⌉
(
ri
ηi
)
q˜η00 q˜
ηi
i
≤ (4q˜0q˜i)ri/2 =
[
4q0qi
(q0 + qi)2
]ri/2
.
The above inequality is the well-known Chernoff-
Hoeffding bound for the binomial distribution [23], which
also applies here since q0 > qi ∀ i ∈ F∗d. Thus, in total we
have
6P (ηi ≥ η0) =
r∑
ηrest=0
(
r
ηrest
)
qηrestrest (1− qrest)r−ηrestP (ηi ≥ η0 | ηrest)
≤
r∑
ηrest=0
(
r
ηrest
)
qηrestrest (1− qrest)r−ηrest
[
4q0qi
(q0 + qi)2
](r−ηrest)/2
. (18)
Finally, given that RP ≤ Pfail, inequality (16) is obtained
from the condition (17), by using inequality (18) and the
identity
∑r
a=0
(
r
a
)
pa(1 − p)r−axr−a = [p+ (1− p)x]r. 
According to observation 2, the phase-error rate in the
signal after PEC decreases exponentially in the block-
length r. If we are not interested on a tight upper bound
on RP, we may upper-bound the right-hand side of this
condition as follows
RP ≤
∑
n∈F∗
d
[
1−
(√
q
(k)
0 −
√
q
(k)
n
)2]r
≤ (d− 1)
[
1−
(√
q
(k)
0 −
√
q
(k)
n˜
)2]r
. (19)
where q
(k)
n˜ = max
{
q
(k)
n | n ∈ F∗d
}
, while equality in the
latter part holds if and only if q
(k)
n = q
(k)
n˜ , ∀n ∈ F∗d.
Although this last step is not at all necessary, it consid-
erably simplifies the subsequent notation and discussion.
Recall now that the quantities ξ
(k)
n and χ(k) become
arbitrarily small as k → ∞. Thus, in view of Eq. (12),
Eq. (19) may further simplified to
RP ≤ (d− 1)

1−
(
ξ
(k)
0 − ξ(k)n˜
)2
4d
+O (3)


r
,
where O(3) denotes third-order terms in ξ
(k)
n˜ , χ
(k) and
ξ
(k)
0 . Inclusion of such higher-order terms may only
lead to negligible corrections in the argument of the ex-
ponent. At any rate, the phase-error rate will always
be upper-bounded by a quantity which decreases expo-
nentially fast in r. Alternatively, using the inequality
(1− x)r ≤ exp(−rx) for all x < 1, we obtain
RP ≤ (d− 1) exp

−r
(
ξ
(k)
0 − ξ(k)n˜
)2
4d

 . (20)
We turn now to estimate the corresponding dit-flip-error
rate in the signal.
2. Dit-flip-error rate
As we mentioned before, the PEC involves (r − 1)
BXOR gates in the complementary basis. During these
gates the dit-flip errors propagate backwards from the
target to the control qudit. As a result, at the end of
the PEC the dit-flip-error rate in the remaining particles
increases by at most r times (the control qudit-pair itself
may initially suffer from a dit-flip-error), i.e.,
RD ≡
∑
m∈F∗
d
∑
n∈Fd
pPmn ≤ r
∑
m∈F∗
d
∑
n∈Fd
p(k)mn. (21)
According to the preceding discussion the net effect of
the PEC is to reduce any phase errors of the form Amn
with n 6= 0, while possibly increasing dit-flip errors of
the form Am0 with m 6= 0. Thus, at first site, the whole
situation seems to be a vicious circle since PEC tends
to destroy what was achieved in DER and vice-versa. A
way out of this stumbling block relies on the judicious
combination of DER and PEC.
C. A judicious combination of DER and PEC
For a given 2d-state protocol (i.e., for a fixed d) Al-
ice and Bob agree in advance upon a fixed and arbitrar-
ily small security parameter ǫ > 0. They apply many
rounds (k ≫ 1) of D-step, until there exists an integer
r > 0 such that a single application of the PEC will bring
the quantum-channel error rate in the finally surviving
pairs to values below ǫ. Clearly, the protocol has to be
aborted if the estimated integer r exceeds the number of
remaining pairs immediately after the DER procedure.
More precisely, at the end of DER, Alice and Bob may
choose the block length for the repetition code to be
r ≈ ǫ
2
∑
m∈F∗
d
∑
n∈Fd
p
(k)
mn
=
ǫ
2
(
1 +
1
χ(k)
)
≥ ǫ
2χ(k)
.(22)
Note that for this particular choice of the block-length,
r →∞ as k →∞.
The key point now is that for such a choice of r, the
overall channel error rate Q = 1 − pP00 can be upper-
bounded as follows
Q ≤ RD +RP
≤ ǫ
2
+ (d− 1) exp

− ǫ
8
(
ξ
(k)
0 − ξ(k)n˜
)2
dχ(k)

 , (23)
7where inequalities (21) and (20) have been used. Thus,
for any given dimension of the information carriers,Q < ǫ
provided that[
ξ
(k)
0 − ξ(k)n˜
]2
dχ(k)
>
8
ǫ
ln
[
2(d− 1)
ǫ
]
, (24)
As long asQ < ǫ, Alice and Bob share a number of nearly
perfect pairs whose fidelity with respect to the ideal state
|Ψ00〉 is exponentially close to one. The final key can then
be obtained by measuring each pair separately along the
standard basis, and the information that an eavesdropper
may have on it, is also upper bounded by the security
parameter ǫ.
The condition (24) is a sufficient condition for secret-
key distillation in the context of 2d-state QKD protocols
using two Fourier-dual bases. In particular, it determines
the error rates which can be tolerated by such protocols
using a GL2KD procedure. From that point of view, it is
a generalization of the corresponding condition for fully
symmetric qudit-based protocols obtained by Chau [7].
Unfortunately, the number of independent parameters
in inequality (24) scales quadratically with d, and thus
an analytical (or even numerical) solution becomes rather
difficult for d > 3. Hence, in order to obtain an analytic
expression for the tolerable error rate for arbitrary di-
mensions we had to resort to isotropic quantum channels.
The related results will be discussed in detail in Sec. IV.
For the time being we close this section by summarizing
the main points in the reduction of the EB version of the
2d-state QKD protocol to a P&M one.
D. Reduction to a P&M QKD scheme
In general, not every EB QKD protocol can be reduced
to a P&M one. The main difficulty appears in the reduc-
tion of the underlying quantum key-distillation procedure
to a purely classical one. The advantage of the GL2KD
is that by construction it allows for such a reduction [4].
The reduction of the EB 2d-state QKD protocol to a
P&M one, which tolerates precisely the same error rates,
follows the same steps as for other protocols [4, 7, 16].
Here, for the sake of completeness, we would like to
summarize the four cornerstones of such a reduction.
First, during the distribution stage, Alice can measure
all the halves of the pairs before sending the other halves
to Bob. This is equivalent to choosing a random dit-
string and encoding each dit in the corresponding qudit-
state, in one of the two Fourier-dual bases. Second,
the XOR operation used in the quantum key-distillation
procedure can be easily replaced by its classical ana-
logue. Thus, the DER stage is immediately reduced to a
classical error-rejection (advantage distillation) process.
Third, the quantum circuit of the PEC can also be re-
duced to a classical one. Such a reduction relies on the
fact that the sequence of gates applied independently by
Alice and Bob in each block of r qudits during PEC,
i.e., F−11 (XOR1→r . . .XOR1→2)
⊗r
j=1 Fj , is equivalent to⊗r
j=2 F
−1
j
(
XOR
(+)
r→1 . . .XOR
(+)
2→1
)
. This equivalence fol-
lows by induction from the fact that for any two qudits,(
F−1c ⊗ 1 t
)
XORc→t (Fc ⊗ Ft) =
(
1 c ⊗ F−1t
)
XOR
(+)
t→c,
where XOR
(+)
c→t : |x〉c ⊗ |y〉t 7→ |x〉c ⊗ |x + y〉t. Finally,
the last essential point in the reduction is the observation
that the key-distillation procedure does not rely on phase
information.
The above steps lead to a P&M 2d-state QKD proto-
col with the distribution and the verification-test stages
discussed in Sec. II. The corresponding classical key-
distillation stage of the protocol proceeds as follows
[4, 5, 7].
DER: Alice and Bob perform many rounds of D-step.
In each round they randomly form tetrads of their dits.
For each tetrad j, Alice announces the parity of her dits,
i.e., she announces X
(j)
1 −X(j)2 , where X(j)i denotes the
i-th pair of tetrad j. Similarly, Bob announces the parity
of his corresponding dits Y
(j)
1 −Y (j)2 . One of the dit-pairs
(say X
(j)
1 and Y
(j)
1 ) survives if and only if the announced
parities agree. This process is repeated (many rounds of
D-step), until there is an integer r > 0 such that a single
application of the following phase-error correction will
bring the overall error rate in the remaining signal below
ǫ. The protocol is aborted if the estimated parameter r
exceeds the number of remaining dits.
PEC: In the classical PEC (which is essentially privacy
amplification), Alice and Bob randomly divide their re-
maining dit-pairs into blocks each containing r dit-pairs.
Let us denote by (X
(j)
i , Y
(j)
i ) the i-th dit-pair in block
j. Alice and Bob, replace each block by the parity of its
dits, i.e., by
∑r
i=1X
(j)
i and
∑r
i=1 Y
(j)
i , respectively. In
this way, the final secret key essentially consists of the
estimated parities for each one of the blocks.
In closing, it has to be noted here that for a more effi-
cient secret-key distillation the two legitimate users may
follow the adaptive key-distillation procedure introduced
by Chau [5, 7]. The main difference is that Alice and Bob
do not apply many rounds of D-step and PEC in order to
bring the overall error rate below the security parameter
ǫ. Instead, they simply adjust their DER and PEC in
order to bring the overall error rate below, let us say 5%.
From that point on, they switch to more efficient error-
correction and privacy amplification using concatenated
Calderbank-Shore-Steane codes.
IV. ISOTROPIC QUANTUM CHANNELS
An isotropic channel is characterized by p0j = pj0 =
p10 and pij = pji = p11 for i, j ∈ F∗d. It turns out that
isotropy is an inherent property of the two-basis protocols
using qubits (standard BB84) or qutrits [3]. However,
in general for 2d-state protocols using higher dimensions
(d > 3), isotropy cannot be justified so easily, unless
the quantum channel itself is isotropic (e.g., open-space
8quantum cryptography).
The robustness and security of various QKD proto-
cols under the assumption of isotropic eavesdropping
has been extensively studied in the QKD literature
[10, 11, 24, 25, 26, 27]. In particular, we know that at any
rate the isotropy assumption does not affect the threshold
disturbance for secret-key distillation which, for 2d-state
protocols, is given by Eq. (1) [3]. In this section, our
purpose is to further analyze the sufficient condition for
key distillation (24) in the framework of isotropic quan-
tum channels and derive an analytic expression for the
tolerable error rate of 2d-state QKD protocols.
Instead of isotropic channels, we may consider a
slightly more general class of channels for which p0j 6=
pj0, that is
pmn =


p00 p01 . . . p01
p10 p11 . . . p11
...
...
. . .
...
p10 p11 . . . p11

 . (25)
Given the normalization condition (3), such a channel in-
volves three independent parameters and thus the deriva-
tion of an analytic expression for the tolerable error rate
is possible. Moreover, by setting p01 = p10 we can easily
obtain the corresponding expressions for isotropic chan-
nels.
A. Tolerable error rates
For channels satisfying Eq. (25), Eq. (8) yields for the
probabilities after k rounds of D-step
p
(k)
00 =
[p00 + (d− 1)p01]2k + (d− 1)(p00 − p01)2k
d Π
,
p
(k)
0n =
[p00 + (d− 1)p01]2k − (p00 − p01)2k
d Π
,
p
(k)
m0 =
[p10 + (d− 1)p11]2k + (d− 1)(p10 − p11)2k
d Π
,
p(k)mn =
[p10 + (d− 1)p11]2k − (p10 − p11)2k
d Π
,
where Π = [p00+(d−1)p01]2k+(d−1)[p10+(d−1)p11]2k .
In view of these relations, the form (25) is invariant under
D-steps since we have that p
(k)
0n = p
(k)
01 , p
(k)
m0 = p
(k)
10 and
p
(k)
mn = p
(k)
11 , ∀m,n 6= 0. Therefore, all the phase-error
rates q
(k)
n with n 6= 0, are equal at the end of DER and the
corresponding quantum channel is therefore symmetric
with respect to phase errors.
As in the previous section, we may also introduce the
parameters A(m,n) and C(m). In fact, for the particular
class of channels under considerationA(m,n) = A(m) for
all m ∈ Fd and
A(0) =
p00 − p01
p00 + (d− 1)p01 , (26a)
A(m) = A(1) =
p10 − p11
p00 + (d− 1)p01 for m 6= 0, (26b)
C(m) = C(1) =
p10 + (d− 1)p11
p00 + (d− 1)p01 for m 6= 0, (26c)
while C(0) = 1. To proceed further, we note that A(m) =
B(m)C(m), where
B(m) =
pm0 − pm1
pm0 + (d− 1)pm1 = B(1), (27)
and [B(m)]2
k → 0, as k → ∞. Thus, using Eqs. (26)
and (27), Eqs. (13) can be simplified to
ξ
(k)
0 = (d− 1)
∑
m∈Fd
[A(m)]
2k
, (28a)
ξ(k)n = −
∑
m∈Fd
[A(m)]
2k
for n 6= 0, (28b)
χ(k) = (d− 1) [C(1)]2k , (28c)
where∑
m∈Fd
[A(m)]2
k
= [A(0)]2
k
+
∑
m∈F∗
d
[B(m)]2
k
[C(m)]2
k
= [A(0)]2
k
+ (d− 1)[B(1)C(1)]2k . (29)
Accordingly, condition (24) now reads
d
{
[A(0)]2
k
+ (d− 1)[B(1)C(1)]2k
}2
(d− 1)[C(1)]2k >
8
ǫ
ln
[
2(d− 1)
ǫ
]
,
or equivalently [setting A = A(0), B = B(1) and C =
C(1)]
dA2
k+1
(d− 1)C2k + d(d− 1)C
2B2
k+1
+ 2dA2
k
B2
k
> f(d, ǫ),
(30)
where f(d, ǫ) = 8 ǫ−1 ln [2(d− 1)/ǫ].
Recall now that the positive quantities A2
k → 0,
C2
k → 0 and B2k → 0 for k → ∞. Thus, inequality
(30) can always be satisfied for any k such that
dA2
k+1
(d− 1)C2k > f(d, ǫ). (31)
For a given dimension, this latter inequality defines the
critical number of D-steps kc, such that for k > kc in-
equality (30) is satisfied. In particular, solving (31) with
respect to k we obtain
kc = log2
{
ln [(d− 1)f(d, ǫ)/d]
ln(A2/C)
}
. (32)
9This is a well defined quantity provided that A2 > C,
i.e., for
(p00 − p01)2 > [p10 + (d− 1)p11][p00 + (d− 1)p01]. (33)
where Eqs. (26) have been used. The same inequal-
ity holds for isotropic channels but p01 = p10. This is
therefore a sufficient condition for secret-key distillation
in the context of any 2d-state QKD protocol under the
assumption of isotropic quantum channels. In particular,
it determines the error rates which can be tolerated by
such protocols using a GL2KD process.
Recall now that according to Eq. (5) the estimated
disturbance for the isotropic channel is D = [1 − p00 +
(d − 1)2p11]/2. Moreover, due to the normalization con-
dition (3), inequality (33) actually involves two indepen-
dent parameters (say p00, p11). Thus, estimating the val-
ues of p00 which satisfy it, we obtain the tolerable error
rate (disturbance) which depends on both d and p11, i.e.,
D2CC(d, p11). In fact, we find that D2CC(d, p11) increases
monotonically with respect to p11. Hence, the worst-case
scenario (from Alices’s and Bob’s point of view) corre-
sponds to p11 = 0 for which we obtain for the tolerable
disturbance
D2CC(d) =
1− p00
2
=
2(d− 1)
4d− 1 +√1 + 4d, (34)
where D2CC(d) = D2CC(d, p11 = 0). Given a particular
dimension of the information carriers (i.e., a specific
2d-state protocol), the GL2KD procedure enables Alice
and Bob to generate a provably secure key whenever
the estimated disturbance is below D2CC(d) or else, the
quantum channel error rate is below 2D2CC(d).
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FIG. 1: 2d-state QKD protocols : The tolerable error rate
D2CC (dashed line) and its theoretical upper boundDth (solid
line) as functions of the dimension d. Secret-key distillation is
impossible in the regime (I), while it may be possible for error
rates belowDth. In the regime (II) a secret key can be distilled
by means of the key-distillation procedure considered here.
Inset: The gap between the two regimes δ(d) = D2CC −Dth
is plotted as a function of the dimension. The symbols (tri-
angles, circles and squares) correspond to prime dimensions.
B. Discussion
The tolerable disturbance D2CC and its theoretical up-
per bound Dth are plotted as functions of the dimension
d, in Fig. 1. First of all, we see that D2CC(d) < Dth for
all d. Actually, the difference between the two bounds
δ(d) ≡ Dth −D2CC scales with dimension as
δ(d) =
(d− 1) (−2 +√1 + 4d)
2d(4d− 3) , (35)
and is also plotted in the inset of Fig. 1. It is also worth
noting that δ increases as we go from qubits (d = 2) to
qutrits (d = 3). It reaches its maximum value around
d = 4 (i.e., for quatrits) and decreases monotonically for
higher dimensions. Note that the same behavior also ap-
pears in the case of (d+1)-basis protocols [7]. Moreover,
as d→∞, we have that
D2CC(d) ≈ 1
2
− 1
4
√
d
,
while δ(d) ≈ 1/4√d. In other words, we see that the
the tolerable error rate for the 2d-state QKD protocols
approaches its theoretical upper bound as 1/
√
d for d→
∞. This is in contrast to the (d + 1)-basis protocols
where the corresponding asymptotic behavior scales with
dimension as 1/d.
A special case of the isotropic channel we have just
considered is the so-called depolarizing channel for which
pmn = p01 for (m,n) 6= (0, 0). In this case, condition (33)
reduces to Eq. (36) of Ref. [7] i.e.,
(p00 − p10)2 > d p10 [p00 + (d− 1)p10] .
Note also that for d = 2 we recover the well-known tol-
erable error rate of the standard BB84 protocol, i.e.,
D2CC(2) = 20% [5, 6].
In closing, it is worth noting that condition (33) can
also be obtained by generalizing the ideas of Ref. [6] to
higher dimensions. More precisely, let us define the char-
acteristic exponent r
(d)
ch ∈ R with the defining property
that there exists an α > 0 such that
lim
k→∞
R
(k)
D(
d−1
d −R
(k)
P
)r(d)ch = α, (36)
where R
(k)
D and R
(k)
P are given by Eqs. (11), respectively.
For channels satisfying (25), the quantities R
(k)
D and
[(d − 1)/d] − R(k)P tend to zero from above, as k → ∞.
Moreover, we obtain the following expression for the
characteristic exponent
r
(d)
ch = ln
[
p00 + (d− 1)p01
p10 + (d− 1)p11
]/
ln
[
p00 + (d− 1)p01
p00 − p11
]
.
Following [6], Eq. (33) can now be obtained from the
condition for asymptotic correctability, that is r
(d)
ch >
10
2. However, we would like to stress that it is still an
open problem why this particular correctability condi-
tion, which was originally derived for qubit-based QKD
protocols, is also valid for 2d-state protocols and isotropic
channels.
V. CONCLUSIONS
We have discussed the error-tolerance of qudit-based
QKD protocols using two mutually unbiased (Fourier-
dual) bases. In particular, we focused on Gottesman-Lo-
type key-distillation procedures. For arbitrary quantum
channels subject only to the symmetry between the two
bases used in the protocol, we derived a sufficient con-
dition for secret-key distillation, thus extending known
results on depolarizing quantum channels.
In the case of isotropic quantum channels, we were able
to analyze this condition further and to obtain an analyt-
ical expression for the tolerable error rate as a function
of the dimension d of the information carriers. Specif-
ically, as d → ∞, the tolerable error rate scales with
dimension as 1/2 − 1/4
√
d, thus approaching its upper
theoretical bound, that is 1/2. This asymptotic behavior
is substantially different from the corresponding behav-
ior in the fully symmetric (d+ 1)-basis protocols, where
the tolerable error rate scales as 1− (3 +√5)/2d.
Unfortunately, for moderate values of d, the tolerable
error rate is always well below its corresponding theoreti-
cal upper bound Dth(d). Hence, the development of new
classical key-distillation protocols which will be able to
bridge this gap still remains an interesting open problem.
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